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Abstract
This paper examines the link between increased trade and regional GDP growth 
across the regional income distribution in Greece during the post-EMU period 
(2000–2013). By means of quantile regression techniques, panel fixed effects and 
system generalized method of moments (GMM), we disentangle the effects of EU 
trade—trading with generally richer countries—versus global trade—in the case 
of Greece, mostly trading with poorer countries—at several points of the regional 
income distribution to identify differences in trade elasticities. The analysis finds 
that the impact of EU trade is highly heterogeneous and mainly affects negatively the 
economy of the richer regions in Greece. In contrast, the effects of EU trade display 
insignificant results for the lower-income regions, attributed to the absence of direct 
substitution effects.
Keywords Trade · Regional inequality · Economic growth · Greece
JEL Classification F13 · O24 · R11 · R12
1 Introduction
Trade integration is normally expected to unravel a multitude of benefits in terms 
of growth-inducing factors, such as larger market access, productivity, and knowl-
edge transfer gains. However, it may also pose a serious of threats, such as substi-
tution effects for the domestic competing industries and to those vulnerable regions 
more exposed to the trade integration dynamics (Petrakos et  al. 2012; Autor et  al. 
2013). Increased trade is expected to produce large macro-economic benefits, but 
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not all territories are likely to benefit in the same way. While some regions within a 
country may reap the lion’s share of these benefits, others may lose out both in terms 
of economic performance and employment, triggering negative social and political 
reactions.
This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of the geographically uneven 
effects of increased trade in a peripheral EU economy, following accession to the 
Eurozone. Given the observed spatial imbalances in both the evolution of trade and 
the growth trajectories of EU regions (Cappelen et al. 2003; Camagni and Capello 
2009), our analysis aims to uncover the mechanisms behind the relatively poor per-
formance of Greek regions in a context of deepening European and global trade. As 
EU integration intensified, the great majority of Greek regions stagnated. The lack of 
economic dynamism of regions in Greece has attracted the attention of international 
scholars seeking to reveal the mechanisms and shed light on its causes (e.g., Rod-
ríguez-Pose et al. 2012; Petrakos et al. 2012; Petrakos and Psycharis 2016). Among 
the salient factors identified are competition pressures related to the widening and 
deepening of the EU integration process (Petrakos et al. 2012); the inability of the 
Public Investment Programmes in promoting regional convergence and narrowing the 
development gap among Greek prefectures (Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2012); the speciali-
zation of Greek regions in export-declining sectors that experience labor productiv-
ity losses (Kallioras et al. 2016); and the peripherality of the Greek economy com-
pared to the EU core. Studies also stress the institutional weaknesses and the limited 
effectiveness of the adjustment programmes (Kotios et al. 2017), the uneven growth 
returns of the EU Structural Funds programmes (Sotiriou and Tsiapa 2015), and the 
severe impact of the financial crisis (Petrakos and Psycharis 2016).
The case of Greece is important on account of a number of prominent reasons. 
Greece became part of the Eurozone despite lower levels of economic competitive-
ness than other Eurozone members. It is characterized by a weaker industrial base in 
terms of economies of scale and regional inequalities are pronounced. The examina-
tion of the Greek case also presents a setting for external validity to other peripheral 
economies, while the phenomenally deep recession that affected Greece post-2009 
has to be partly seen in light of the previous failures of Greek regions in securing 
higher competitiveness and sustainable growth.
Greece’s accession to the Eurozone (2001) led to a rapid deepening of trade inte-
gration. The effect of the common currency reduced overall transaction costs, includ-
ing borrowing costs and facilitated the surge of imports. Although trade liberalization 
(i.e., inclusion into the EU common market) started in the late 1980s, it was after the 
mid-1990s that imports from the EU more than doubled, while exports followed a 
less pronounced upward trend. The combination of intensified trade with the EU, the 
uneven distribution of economic activity in the Greek territory due to its concentra-
tion in two main urban centers (Psycharis et al. 2014), as well as the heterogeneity of 
Greek regions with respect to their structural characteristics, provide an interesting 
setting to empirically explore the regional response to the deepening of trade in a 
peripheral economy.
Empirical research on regional disparities has identified a mosaic of determi-
nants explaining uneven growth trajectories. These include geography, initial lev-
els of income, human capital endowments, the quality of infrastructure as well as 
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accessibility and institutional deficiencies (Midelfart-Knarvik and Overman 2002; 
Crescenzi and Rodríguez-Pose 2012; Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2012; Monastiriotis et al. 
2017). The extent to which trade acts as a causal mechanism of uneven growth at 
the sub-national (regional) level is much less understood and the evidence appears 
inconclusive (Paluzie 2001; Petrakos et al. 2012; Kallioras and Pinna 2015).  Over-
all, different types of trade affect regions at different levels of development differently 
(Rodríguez-Pose 2012).
This paper analyses the differential economic effects of rapid increases in trade 
with different types of countries for the case of Greece. It pitches EU trade integra-
tion—generally with countries wealthier than Greece—vis-à-vis trade with the rest 
of the world, which—with the exception of energy-related trade—involves mostly 
countries with a lower level of development and lower labor costs than Greece. These 
different types of trade integration are expected to have heterogeneous competition 
effects and thus produce a diverse set of growth-inducing and substitution effects 
across the regional income distribution. We thus contribute to the existing debate by 
explicitly testing the hypothesis that the economic development of a region, and spe-
cifically its position in the regional income distribution, will influence the nature and 
intensity of the trade effect and that this effect will depend on the type of trade being 
undertaken.
The heterogeneous trade integration effects will be evaluated by means of quantile 
regression techniques. Such techniques allow testing whether the impact of increased 
trade differs according to the income level of a region. We thus test the hypothesis 
that more advanced regions will be more affected by EU trade, due to their relatively 
similar sectoral structure to the composition of EU trade flows (compared to non-
EU trade), which, in turn, intensifies import competition pressures. In other words, a 
more advanced region will produce (and export) a more similar bundle of goods and 
products to those of its core EU trade partners, compared with a poorer, agricultural, 
more ‘sheltered’,1 and peripheral region. This renders the competition from the EU 
fiercer for the advanced region compared to the poorer region.
Consequently, substitution effects from EU trade (especially intra-industry EU 
trade) will affect richer regions and will impact poorer regions  less, as they do not 
directly compete with the more advanced EU imports. The methodological nov-
elty of the analysis is to detect the heterogeneity of the trade-growth nexus across 
the regional income distribution by decomposing the effects of two different types of 
trade integration.
Although quantile regression techniques have received attention in cross-country 
growth studies (e.g., Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 2011), the regional dimension remains 
underexplored (Costa-i-Font and Rodríguez-Oreggia 2005). Additionally, the 
1 ’Sheltered’ regions are those economies that rely heavily on agricultural subsidies and the public sec-
tor with a low integration in the global economy (Petrakos and Psycharis 2016). As stressed in Fratesi 
and Rodríguez-Pose (2016) ‘sheltered’ economies are those “more impervious to changes in the business 
cycle; with an economic structure less capable of taking advantage of high growth periods” (Rodríguez-
Pose and Fratesi 2007: 624).
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parameter heterogeneity of a number of growth determinants across regions provides 
fruitful insights for policy recommendations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect.  2 the theoretical 
framework and review of the empirical evidence are presented. Section 3 provides a 
descriptive analysis of EU trade and the regional growth performance in Greece. Sec-
tion 4 is devoted to methodology and empirical results, while in Sect. 5 we conclude 
and discuss some policy implications.
2  The geographically uneven impact of trade
2.1  Spatial implications of trade on growth
The theories on the intra-national spatial distribution of the benefits stemming from 
trade integration stem primarily from the new economic geography (NEG) theory 
(Krugman and Livas Elizondo 1996). The corresponding models are mostly con-
cerned with the question of “whether increasing cross-border integration leads to 
a greater intra-national concentration of manufacturing activity, thereby increasing 
regional inequality” (Rodríguez-Pose 2012: 112). According to these theories, trade 
can give rise to core-periphery patterns, which are the outcome of the interplay 
between centripetal and centrifugal forces. These forces depend on a set of assump-
tions pertaining to transport costs and the mobility of (agricultural and manufactur-
ing) labor (Paluzie 2001). As such, in the theoretical literature, the trade-growth rela-
tions at the regional level are framed only implicitly as a response to the relocation of 
economic activity across space.
From a theoretical perspective, the geographical implications of trade start with 
the neoclassical trade theory. Under a Heckscher–Ohlin framework, trade is based on 
the comparative advantage principle, with theoretical models that focus on the rela-
tionship between international trade and the distribution of income across countries 
trading with each other. From this perspective, free trade would benefit any factor 
used exclusively in the production of exportable commodities and harm those factors 
used in the import-competing sector. The key implication of the model is that the set 
of industries produced by a country is a function of its relative endowments. In an 
open world trading system, relatively capital- and skill-abundant countries, like the 
core EU countries, will manufacture a more capital- and skill-intensive mix of prod-
ucts than relatively labor-abundant countries, like southern EU countries, including 
Greece.
The neoclassical theory predicts that trade in goods between regions with different 
endowments of production inputs (e.g., skilled and unskilled labor, capital) equalizes 
the relative wages and rates of return to capital in each country/region. For example 
in places with an abundance of unskilled labor relative to skilled labor, such as the 
less developed regions of Greece, unskilled wages would be low in the absence of 
trade. In the presence of trade, Greece will specialize in the product or products using 
the abundant (unskilled) factor. This will lead to a rise in wages associated with the 
unskilled-intensive product, due to the increase in the demand of the exported prod-
uct. The geographical consequence of this will be convergence across regions (Nello 
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2012). However, this assumes no factor mobility and diminishing returns to factor 
inputs. In reality the bundle of products that a country/region exports and imports is 
more complex and comprises of both skilled and unskilled-intensive products—as 
in the case of Greece. Hence, the spatial outcomes become more complicated and 
less predictable in terms of the effects of import competition across the entire skill- 
and capital-intensive spectrum. From this perspective, the neoclassical trade theory is 
unlikely to explain the surge of intra-industry trade between countries with different 
endowments and income levels and the spatial growth impact at the regional level. 
This is particularly the case in a country such as Greece, with large internal industrial 
and economic contrasts.
The New Trade Theory (NTT), the New Economic Geography (NEG), and the 
endogenous growth theory also have considerable implications for the geography of 
trade. The NTT explains the surge of intra-industry trade as a result of increasing 
returns to scale and product differentiation. NEG and, in part, the endogenous growth 
theory, offer the theoretical foundations for explaining the growth returns of trade 
in large agglomerations. One of the main predictions of NEG supported by empiri-
cal evidence is that the reduction in trade costs—in combination with increasing 
returns to scale—is expected to increase the growth returns from trade in large urban 
agglomerations (e.g., Ottaviano et al. 2002), thus producing uneven growth patterns. 
The gradual reduction in transport costs worldwide and the reduction in transaction 
costs from the creation of the Eurozone played a catalyst role in the deepening of 
EU trade integration. The outcome has been within-country concentration trends in 
manufacturing and services (Brülhart and Traeger 2005).
The question to be answered is “if long term growth is driven by the endogenous 
accumulation of experience through learning-by-doing, then trade between regions 
can lead one region to specialize in industries in which it has a comparative advan-
tage (e.g., traditional economic activities), but for which the opportunities to learn 
are relatively small, so that the growth rate in that region may be lower precisely 
because of trade integration” (Martin 2001: 6). With initial conditions reflecting the 
specialization of core areas on higher value-added industries, trade and, in particular, 
the reduction of transaction costs are expected to enhance the spatial concentration of 
increasing returns to scale activities in the core. By contrast, the periphery will spe-
cialize in industries with constant returns to scale (Martin 2001).
Acting via knowledge transmission channels, trade may amplify core-periphery 
patterns by benefiting disproportionately core areas with high concentrations of 
specialized labor and other prior advantages of higher levels of R&D expenditure, 
physical and human capital, and better institutions. Clustering is expected to occur 
due to the prevalence of agglomeration forces, such as firm-level economies of scale 
and external economies of scale. This, in combination with highly specialized labor 
turnover and reduced trade (transport and transaction) costs, creates virtuous cycles 
of growth in core regions (Nello 2012). As per the NEG, the surge of trade will thus 
benefit core regions to a far larger extent than regions in the periphery that lack the 
favorable geography and initial conditions to compete successfully in an integrated 
market.
The endogenous growth theory predicts that trade generates positive exter-
nalities and spillover effects, which facilitate the transition and dissemination of 
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technological progress, knowledge, and ideas (Fine 2000). However, this may not 
be the case when trading counterparts exhibit considerable differences in terms of 
endowments and level of technology, while lagging economies may find it difficult to 
grasp the dynamic effects of trade also attributable to the lack of absorptive capaci-
ties (Devereux and Lapham 1994). To this end, as Martin (2001: 2) argues “because 
neither policy-makers, nor economists are ready to give up the gains from trade inte-
gration, a natural implication is to employ public policies to counteract the possibility 
of increased regional inequalities which are viewed as unacceptable on distributional 
and political grounds”. The latter signifies that uneven or even negative net effects 
from deeper EU trade integration may affect some regions—and, in particular, less 
developed regions—, which urges regional policy intervention.
The main theoretical model on the spatial effects of trade was constructed by Krug-
man and Livas Elizondo (1996). They have since been challenged by other scholars, 
such as Paluzie (2001). Using the example of Mexico, Krugman and Livas Elizondo 
(1996) show that trade liberalization brought a de-concentration of industrial activity 
and shifted it away from Mexico City to the northern states (due to proximity to the 
US border and the centrifugal forces of congestion). They explain that the economic 
landscape changed rapidly after the country opened up to trade and economic activity 
evened out as inputs could be sourced from abroad and output was exported. A dis-
persal of manufacturing activity ensued, reducing regional disparities.2
This view was later challenged by Paluzie (2001). Departing from similar assump-
tions,3 she constructs a model to explain the evolution of regional inequalities in 
Spain. She finds that the opening up of a closed economy brought further regional 
polarization that coincided with the interruption of the convergence process in the 
EU and especially in Spain (in the 1980s). This model adheres more to the basic 
Krugman core-periphery model in which labor mobility plays a key role in reinforc-
ing the unequal geography of trade and regional polarization, which comes as a result 
of trade liberalization (Paluzie 2001). For the study of the regional growth-trade 
nexus, such theoretical framework is limited, as the existing theoretical models in the 
NEG literature use the fluctuation in transport costs to determine the location of eco-
nomic activity. This, in turn drives the evolution of regional disparities. Much less is 
spelled out in relation to the actual benefits and costs of increased trade, conditional 
on the wealth of regions. The existing empirical literature has relied mostly on broad 
typologies of rural versus urban areas or poor versus rich countries (e.g., Rodríguez 
Pose and Gill 2006; Rodríguez-Pose 2012; Krugman and Livas Elizondo 1996).
In the specific case of Greece, considering that the bulk of trade between Greece 
and the EU is concentrated in the manufacturing sector (Petrakos et  al. 2012), the 
above models offer insight for the study of regional growth trajectories. The surge 
of trade for an EU peripheral small country, such as Greece, has led to high trade 
2 With the exception of the south of Mexico, which ontinues to lag behind.
3 These include two sectors, two regions, and the emphasis on the relocation of manufacturing activ-
ity due to free trade. The main difference between Krugman and Livas Elizondo’s (1996) and Paluzie’s 
models is that the centrifugal force is the congestion cost in the former model, while in the latter it is the 
agricultural population, which is tied to the land.
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deficits, due to the inability of the economy to compete with the economies of scale 
of northern EU industries. This has resulted in import competition and substitution 
effects that harm the incumbent industry in manufacturing hubs (e.g., Petrakos et al. 
2012), affecting disproportionally the growth trajectories of more advanced regions.
2.2  Trading with richer and poorer countries and its spatial consequences
To what extent does trading with countries at different points in the wealth and 
technological scale affect the economic performance of regions within a country? 
Although this topic has received relatively limited attention, research is increasingly 
showing that trade leads to uneven growth patterns at the subnational level, suggest-
ing heterogeneous responses to increases in trade exposure (Rodríguez-Pose 2012; 
Autor et al. 2013; Petrakos and Psycharis 2016). There is a growing consensus that 
trading with more advanced economies often benefits the core areas within countries 
rather than peripheries. López-Bazo et  al. (1999), for example, found that deeper 
EU trade integration resulted in poorer regions suffering “higher disequilibrium in 
their labour markets” (López-Bazo et al. 1999: 366), resulting in negative effects on 
growth and convergence.
Greece followed this trend. The opening of the Greek economy to trade with the 
more advanced countries of the EU—Greece was the poorest member at the time 
of joining in 1981—coincided with a strengthening of the concentration of eco-
nomic activity in the core urban cities and manufacturing hubs. The result was grow-
ing regional inequalities, in terms both of the location of economic activity and the 
growth prospects of regions. Higher value-added manufacturing production became 
more concentrated in the upper quantiles of the regional income distribution leading 
to rising regional disparities (Caraveli and Tsionas 2012).
Moreover, changes in trade patterns seem to affect the evolution of regional ine-
quality in poorer countries to a far greater extent than in richer ones. In the case of 
less developed countries, Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2014) find a positive link 
between trade and spatial inequality in 22 developing countries over the period 
1990–2006. They conclude that a greater degree of trade openness reduces the GDP 
per capita of poorer regions and increases that of richer regions, thereby creating win-
ners and losers that coincide with rich and poor regions respectively.
But increases in trade do not necessarily always benefit the more developed 
regions of a country at the expense of the poorer ones. When the timing of the open-
ing to trade is considered, the territorial impact of trade can be quite different. As 
Kallioras and Petrakos (2010) have shown for the case of the post-2004 member 
states, regions initially more exposed to trade competition with the rest of the EU 
suffered more in terms of industrial employment destruction. Hence, more advanced 
and industrialized regions—but with weak industrial structures—are bound to suf-
fer significant employment losses following increases in trade and economic integra-
tion with more advanced economies. Specifically, the impact of EU integration in the 
post-2004 member states was fiercer for the more industrially advanced regions—
i.e., the regions that, at the time, produced the greatest part of the national industrial 
gross domestic product (Kallioras and Petrakos 2010). These regions, however, also 
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enjoyed the best conditions—from agglomeration economies, better human capital 
endowments, or more innovation capacity—to combat this decline. Although the 
relationship between the level of development of a region and the exposure to cer-
tain trade partners may go both ways, suggesting that more economically advanced 
regions will trade with richer countries and vice versa, our analysis by taking into 
account the heterogeneity of the income level of the trade partners in part addresses 
the differing impact on regional growth.
Very often and despite the generalized view that trade is beneficial for all parties 
engaged, trade integration can be traumatic. Studies on the first decade of Greece’s 
participation in the EU have stresses that, despite a long transition period follow-
ing EU accession, the Greek economy recorded no export gains and saw a marked 
decline in competitiveness attributed to high levels of import penetration (Arghyrou 
and Bazina 2003). At the sub-national level, empirical evidence on Greece’s EU inte-
gration experience, revealed the inability of Greek regions to compete (successfully) 
with their more advanced counterparts in capital-intensive manufacturing and knowl-
edge-intensive economic activities (Petrakos et al. 2012). The export performance of 
most sectors in Greek regions remained weak, highlighting the role played by compe-
tition from imports in producing negative employment (growth) effects (Fotopoulos 
et al. 2010). Regional idiosyncratic features drove employment growth patterns, with 
domestic demand, stronger in the largest agglomerations, standing out as the critical 
driver of regional employment growth (Fotopoulos et al. 2010).
Hence, while trade integration with more advanced countries can have positive 
and negative economic impacts for more and less developed regions within a country 
engaging in trade, in the case of Greece, we draw on the insights of Petrakos et al. 
(2012) expecting that, as richer regions host higher shares of industrial activity (Cara-
veli and Tsionas 2012), trade integration increased competition pressures there to a 
far greater extent than in more ’sheltered’ or poorer regions. Trade with mainly less 
developed countries in the rest of the world—focused mainly on low level manufac-
turing and agricultural produce—has posed, by contrast, less of a threat for the indus-
try of core regions, while imperilling those in less developed areas of Greece. The 
industrial sector is considered the main diffusion channel of the integration dynamics 
in a spatio-structural context (Amiti 1998), due to “the displaceable character of its 
activities, the tradable character of its products and the linkages it retains with the 
other sectors of production” (Petrakos et al. 2012: 347).
3  Trade and regional inequality in Greece: Facts and figures
The EU has traditionally been the most significant trade partner for Greece, Fig. 1 
sketches the evolution of EU imports into Greece as well as Greek exports to the EU. 
From 2000 onwards there was a sharp climb of EU imports, which coincided with 
the accession into the Eurozone. The high absorption of EU imports was fuelled by 
the lower transaction costs of the common currency union and the large reduction in 
borrowing costs (interest rates fell from 25 to 5%) for both corporations and consum-
ers. In the same period, there was also an upward trend in exports. However, the gap 
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Imports and Exports from/to EU in Greece
(1990 - 2016) 
Imports (EU) Exports (EU)
Post-Maastricht period
Eurozone accession
5th and 6th EU enlargement
Crisis period
EU-ECB-IMF program
Fig. 1  Evolution of Greece’s Trade with the EU
Fig. 2  Map of Region’s GDP as a percentage of the EU average (2000). Source: own elaboration using 
data from EUROSTAT 
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between imports and exports widened significantly after accession up until the crisis 
erupted in late 2008.
Source: own elaboration using data from Eurostat (International trade database).
Greece’s largest trade deficit expanded significantly in the 2002–2008 period, fol-
lowing Eurozone accession. This increase in the trade deficit happened in an econ-
omy with already stark regional inequalities. Figures 2 and 3 display the spatial het-
erogeneity of regional GDP as a percentage of the EU average for the years 2000 
and 2013 respectively. As can be observed, with the exception of Attica and some 
of the islands, most Greek regions remained well below the less developed status of 
regions in the EU (75% of EU average) in 2000. The crisis meant that Greece went 
in economic reverse gear and by 2013 the vast majority of regions did not manage to 
surpass 50% of the EU average.
Figure 4 offers a snapshot of the spatial distribution of the economic development 
of Greek regions (in terms of GDP per cap.) and the share of manufacturing employ-
ment by region. Darker colors correspond to higher levels of economic development 
and larger circles represent higher shares of manufacturing. The majority of the 
economically advanced regions (located on the Athens-Thessaloniki axis) host high 
shares of manufacturing, while the poorer regions in the north (bordering the Balkan 
region) specialize in lower value-added and more labor- and resource-intensive man-
ufacturing. This pattern underlies the hypothesis that more advanced regions, which 
host higher value-added manufacturing, compete with EU imports to a greater extent 
than poorer regions. The relatively advanced regions in the southern Peloponnese and 
Fig. 3  Map of Region’s GDP as a percentage of the EU average (2013). Source: own elaboration using 
data from EUROSTAT 
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Fig. 4  Map of Economic development and MNF share at NUTS III (2013). Source: own elaboration 












2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Regional inequalities (2000-2013)
c.v. c.v.w
Fig. 5  Evolution of regional inequalities. Source: own elaboration using data from El.STAT 
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Crete with lower shares of manufacturing rely mainly on high value-added agricul-
tural production or tourism.
Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of regional disparities based on the calculation 
of both the coefficient of variation (c.v.) of GDP per capita as well as the population-
weighted coefficient of variation (c.v.w.), following Petrakos and Psycharis (2016). 
As depicted in the figure, the un-weighted coefficient of variation (c.v.) shows a sta-
ble and perhaps declining trend of regional inequalities that could be attributed to 
the underperformance of the more advanced regions. This trend is in line with the 
hypothesis on the more pronounced negative effects of increased EU trade for regions 
in the upper quantiles of regional income distribution. This may be a consequence 
of the contraction of the manufacturing sector, which has traditionally been concen-
trated in the mid-income and richer regions. Such contraction brings the more afflu-
ent regions closer to the regional income average, thus reducing regional disparities. 
However, the weighted C.V. follows a slight upward trend indicating a widening of 
regional inequalities, linked to “the dominant position that Athens has in the Greek 
economy and its relatively better performance than the rest of the regions which 
maintain the previous trends of divergence” (Petrakos and Psycharis 2016: 142).
4  Methodology and description of data
The econometric analysis is based on a production-function specification, where 
regional output (Y) is modelled as a function of two main factors of production (capi-
tal and labor). Capital (Κ) is proxied by the expenditures of the public investment 
programme commonly used in the regional growth literature. Labor (L) is proxied 
by population (normalized on regional area size), which also accounts for size and 
urbanization. For the assessment of the impact of EU trade integration on regional 
GDP growth, the equation takes the following form:
The model is extended with the addition of a set of controls X, which is a vector 
of k region-specific variables (growth determinants). The dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of real GDP per capita in region r, at year t; region and year fixed 
effects ( rand t) are included in all models to capture idiosyncratic time-invariant 
differences in growth rates across regions and national business cycles, respectively. 
The model is equivalent to a growth model, as it is a panel fixed effects model with 
log GDP per cap as the dependent variable. The analysis covers the period corre-
sponding to EMU accession—from 2000 to 2013—and is estimated at the NUTS III 
level (50 regions/prefectures). Prefectures in Greece have traditionally been the key 
spatial level for regional development policy (Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2012) and repre-
sent the most disaggregated administrative unit for which trade-related data are avail-
able. The empirical analysis is based on a balanced panel evaluated by means of a 
fixed effects regression and the use of quantile regression techniques. This is followed 
by a system-GMM estimation, with the aim of checking the robustness of the results, 




kXr,t−1 + t + r + r,t
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while simultaneously addressing issues of causality. Quantile regressions in the EU 
regional context have been previously used by Crespo-Cuaresma et al. (2011), indi-
cating that growth determinants differ across quantiles.
The key regressor, TII, takes the form of two different types of trade integration: 
(a) trade integration with the EU, EUT, which represents trade with a group of coun-
tries that is, on the whole, more developed than Greece; and (b) trade with the rest 
of the world, ROWT, that, in the case of Greece, is to a large extent conducted with 
countries with a lower level of development than Greece. The construction of both 
indices is explained in detail below.
Following Petrakos and Psycharis (2016) and Petrakos et  al. (2015), the main 
regressor for trade with more developed countries is the EU trade integration index 
(EUT), which is measured according to the following formula:
The index represents the ratio of imports and exports from/to the EU in region r 
and year t over the total imports and exports of region r in year t. This is an indica-
tor of EU trade intensity. The variable is measured using the actual annual regional 
trade flows at the NUTS III level provided by the National Statistical Office of Greece 
(ELSTAT). We use actual trade flows at the region (nomos) level and not proxies 
based on location quotients, which was the method used in previous research. All 
variables and their sources are described in detail in the appendix (Table 6).
We factor in the level of openness of the region by including the trade openness 
index (Openness), which captures overall trade. The index follows the traditional def-
inition of openness used widely in the literature: the ratio of overall trade (imports 
and exports) of the region over the region’s GDP (Frankel and Romer 1999; Frankel 
and Rose 2002; Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose 2014).
We further test the effects of trade with generally less developed countries, by 
means of a rest of the world (ROWT) trade index. The majority of Greek trade with 
non-EU countries takes place with Turkey, non-EU Balkan countries, and countries 
in Asia and North Africa. Hence, trade integration with these markets is likely to 
produce smaller substitution effects, while the export capacities of Greek regions in 
less competitive non-EU markets are expected to be higher. The index is measured 
following the same formula as the previous index:
ROWT is measured as the ratio of trade with non-EU countries over total trade by 
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All variables are included with 1-year lags in order to capture potential delays of 
the impact of the main regressors and of the controls on regional development. The 
introduction of a lag also partly mitigates reverse causality concerns.
The vector of controls contains the following variables. First, the logarithm of 
population density (log PopDen). This variable has traditionally been included in 
standard economic development models and is a proxy of agglomeration economies 
and market size. However, the positive effect on growth is not always confirmed by 
the empirical literature. As noted by de Groot et al. (2011) and empirically tested by 
Psycharis et al. (2014), large agglomerations are more exposed to economic down-
turns and therefore often experience higher negative effects in periods of economic 
crisis than less developed areas. In Greece, regions hosting large cities or specializing 
in manufacturing (like Central Macedonia and part of Continental Greece, Thrace, 
and Thessaly) were hit harder due to “the difficulties of most industries in maintain-
ing production in the face of reduced demand, severely cut bank credit, imported sup-
plies and export guarantees” (Petrakos and Psycharis 2016: 143).
Second, public investment, using data from the Greek public investment pro-
gramme (PIP). This programme is the main regional development tool for incorpo-
rating EU Structural Funds in Greece. The investment is measured as the per capita 
expenditure in region r in year t (log PIP). The programme has the aim of promot-
ing convergence towards the standards of living of the EU and to reduce domestic 
regional asymmetries. However, the efficacy of public investment in Greece has 
frequently been questioned (e.g., Rodríguez-Pose et  al. 2012; Monastiriotis and 
Psycharis 2014). The programme has been found not to be territorially progressive 
enough and to frequently fall prey to corruption, thus limiting its impact on growth 
(Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2012).
A third control variable is the level of connectivity (accessibility) of a region. This 
variable is measured as the inverse time-distance weighted population using road net-
work data in the EU. The distance decay function is a fairly steep exponential func-
tion that approaches zero after four hours of travel. The connectivity of a region is 
expected to be positively related to growth, as it captures the growth dynamics from 
increased market potential. Finally, we also include the share of the public sector in 
the regional economy, measured as the ratio of GVA produced in the public sector 
over the region’s total GDP, following Petrakos and Psycharis (2016).
The aforementioned control variables are included both to improve the fit of the 
model and to test the robustness of the main regressors to the inclusion of alterna-
tive growth determinants. The analysis follows the use of quantile techniques, which 
provide insights in terms of the heterogeneity of the main regressors and the growth 
determinants across the regional income distribution.
5  Empirical results
In the following section we compare the results of panel fixed effects models with 
quantile regression techniques to first assess the impact of increased trade intensity, 
overall openness and trade with EU and non-EU markets on the growth performance 
of the regions. Second, we identify the heterogeneous effects of the various types of 
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trade integration across the regional income distribution. The hypotheses to be tested 
are the following:
H1: The geographical impact of trade strongly depends on where the trade is origi-
nated (in this case EU- versus ROW-trade), as trade origin captures the composition 
of trade flows.
H2: The level of development of a region—proxied by its income per capita—
determines the heterogeneous impact of the two different types of trade on growth.
We expect that, to the extent that the production structure and sectoral profile of 
the better-off Greek regions are more similar to the EU average, then the better-off 
a region is in the distribution, the more it will directly compete with advanced EU 
imports compared to the poorer regions. Less well-off Greek regions are less likely 
to face direct substitution effects from EU trade as, they (i) produce lower value-
added products and (ii) are more sheltered from any type of trade (Petrakos and Psy-
charis 2016). Hence, economically more advanced regions will be more vulnerable to 
increases in EU trade intensity. Poorer regions will, by contrast, be more affected by 
trade of basic products from the rest of the world.
The use of quantile regressions permits assessing how the impact of EU trade var-
ies with the conditional distribution of regional income (GDP per capita). Our analy-
sis estimates the effect of EU trade at five points of the regional income distribu-
tion—for regions at the 0.10, 0.25 0.50, 0.75, and 0.90 income quantiles. By using 
QR techniques we account for the heterogeneity across regions, allowing the coef-
ficients of our main regressors and of the explanatory variables to differ, thus captur-
ing better the asymmetric effects of EU trade on growth. The QR method can also be 
thought of as a way to control implicitly for un-modelled growth determinants.
The assumption of parameter homogeneity is neither an empirical nor a theoreti-
cal result (Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 2011). From a theoretical point of view, the fact 
that economic units which are affected by policies, or hit by negative growth shocks, 
may present different economic dynamics which would “require the specification of 
a different data-generating process has received attention in the economic growth 
literature” (Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 2011: 811). This justifies the need for empirical 
models with parameter heterogeneity.
Empirically, the rationale for using QR is that standard linear regression techniques 
summarize the average relationship between a set of regressors and the outcome vari-
able based on the conditional mean function E(y|x). This provides only a partial view 
of the relationship. Consequently, analysing the relationship at different points in the 
conditional distribution of Y delivers a more accurate picture of the exact impact of 
trade at different levels of the regional income distribution. The most important fea-
ture of quantile regressions is their ability to estimate quantile-specific effects that 
describe the impact of covariates not only on the center, but also on the tails of the 
outcome variable’s distribution. While the central effects, such as the mean effect 
obtained through conditional mean regression, provide a valuable overview of the 
impact of a covariate, they fail to describe the full distributional impact unless the 
variable affects both the central and the tail quantiles in the same way (Chernozhukov 
and Hansen 2008).
We therefore consider the relationship between the regressors and outcome using 
the conditional median function where the median is the 50th percentile, or quantile 
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q, of the empirical distribution. The quantile q(0;1) is that y, which splits the data into 
proportions q below and 1- q above. QR is also more robust to non-normal errors and 
outliers.
5.1  Trading with rich and poor countries
Table 1 presents the results for the fixed effects model—answering  H1—considering 
first the overall openness to trade in Greece. Their connection between trade open-
ness and GDP per capita growth is negative and significant for the average Greek 
region, indicating that overall openness has been detrimental for economic growth in 
Greece. This result is in line with that of Petrakos et al. (2015).
Table 2 focuses explicitly on the impact of trade with the generally more devel-
oped countries of the EU. As indicated by the negative and statistically significant 
coefficient, EU trade has not led to greater regional growth in Greece and this con-
nection remains stable across specifications including additional controls. Although 
EU integration has been sold as a win–win situation for both core and peripheral 
countries, the industry in EU countries with which Greece trades is far too competi-
tive for the Greek industrial fabric. This has potentially triggered an import substi-
tution effect, leading to a contraction of economic activity in Greece, consequently, 
affecting GDP growth.
The coefficient for overall openness remains negative and significant, again high-
lighting the potential negative effects of trade with more developed countries in the 
case of Greece. Among the control variables, public investment displays a negative 
Table 1  Fixed effects—overall openness
Notes: A constant is included but not reported; all explanatory variables are 1-year lags; Robust standard 
errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap
Openness −0.025*** −0.024*** −0.023*** −0.023***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Pop density (log) −0.412*** −0.437*** −0.432*** −0.431***
(0.092) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)






Observations 650 650 650 650
R2 0.807 0.810 0.810 0.811
Region FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
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and significant coefficient, which may be attributed to the meager returns of the pub-
lic investment programme (Rodríguez-Pose et al. 2012), as a possible consequence of 
the fact that the spatial allocation of investment is surprisingly stable over time and 
does not follow a logic of efficiency or equity (Monastiriotis and Psycharis 2014). 
The lack of returns of investment may also reflect ’political inertia’ and graft (Monas-
tiriotis and Psycharis 2014:0.451).
The coefficient for population density is negative but not significant. Although 
population density can trigger agglomeration economies and positive externalities, in 
the case of Greece this is not translated into higher economic growth. Does this hold 
in different stages of the economic cycle? We test whether this is the case by stratify-
ing our sample period in two sub-periods: before and during the crisis (Table 7 in 
Appendix). The results show that during the crisis large agglomerations in Greece 
were most affected and more vulnerable (see also Psycharis et al. 2014).
Public expenditure is positive and significant in explaining regional growth while 
accessibility displays a positive albeit non-significant sign in the baseline models (in 
contrast to the QR models below).
In Table 3, we present the results of trade with the rest of the world. The positive 
and significant sign of trade with non-EU countries reveals that trade with generally 
less developed countries represents a growth stimulus for the average Greek region. 
This may be a consequence of lower substitution effects and the higher competitive-
ness of Greek exports in non-EU markets. This result suggests that the EU markets 
are possibly far too competitive for the internationalization efforts of Greek firms. 
Table 2  Fixed effects—EU trade
A constant is included but not reported; all explanatory variables are 1-year lags; Robust standard errors 
in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap
EU trade −0.039* −0.056** −0.053** −0.055** −0.061***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Pop density (log) −0.342*** −0.434*** −0.458*** −0.452*** −0.453***
(0.090) (0.093) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Openness −0.029*** −0.028*** −0.027*** −0.028***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)






Observations 650 650 650 650 650
R2 0.804 0.808 0.812 0.812 0.813
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
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The main Greek trade partners outside the EU—Turkey, North Africa, China, Balkan 
countries, Russia—have provided a better opportunity for growth, reflecting Greece’s 
competitive advantage. Firms in many Greek regions responded to the post-2008 
financial crisis by expanding their markets, but this expansion has, more often than 
not, not included the EU. For reasons related to the fragmented character of their pro-
ductive base and their specialization, many Greek regions find it difficult to penetrate 
more advanced markets and have sought trade opportunities in less developed coun-
tries outside the EU, where entry requirements may be lower (Petrakos and Psycharis 
2016: 146).
5.2  Trade impact across the Greek regional wealth distribution
But how homogeneous or heterogeneous is the territorial impact of increases in trade 
across Greek regions? Tables 4 and 5 report the results of the model across the five 
income quantiles considered, testing  H2. Table 4 presents the results of the effect of 
EU trade across regional income quantiles. The impact of EU trade is highly hetero-
geneous, as revealed by the significance of the variable in the upper quantiles and its 
insignificance in the lower quantiles. Trade with the richer countries of the EU thus 
affects to a far larger extent better-off Greek regions. Regions with a medium-income 
level (0.50), as well as the rich (0.75) and the richest regions (0.90) seem to lose the 
most from trade with EU partners. By contrast, EU trade does not seem to harm the 
Table 3  Fixed Effects—ROW (Non-EU trade)
A constant is included but not reported; all explanatory variables are 1-year lags; Robust standard errors 
in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap
ROW 0.047** 0.043** 0.049** 0.051**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Pop density (log) −0.431*** −0.454*** −0.453*** −0.449***
(0.093) (0.092) (0.092) (0.092)
Openness −0.029*** −0.028*** −0.029*** −0.028***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
PIP (log) −0.020*** −0.020*** −0.020***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)




Observations 650 650 650 650
R2 0.808 0.811 0.812 0.813
Region FE YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES
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Table 4  Quantile regressions—EU trade and openness
A constant is included but not reported; all explanatory variables are 1-year lags; Robust standard errors 
in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(0.10) (0.25) (0.50) (0.75) (0.90)
Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap
EU trade −0.018 −0.025 −0.047** −0.069** −0.055**
(0.028) (0.029) (0.022) (0.029) (0.023)
Openness −0.021** −0.021** −0.033*** −0.021** −0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Pop density (log) −0.265** −0.353*** −0.380*** −0.469*** −0.354***
(0.111) (0.116) (0.087) (0.116) (0.091)
PIP (log) −0.020** −0.018** −0.013** −0.014* −0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Accessibility 0.092 0.062 0.118** 0.237*** 0.169***
(0.077) (0.080) (0.060) (0.080) (0.063)
Observations 650 650 650 650 650
R2 0.832 0.824 0.836 0.856 0.884
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Table 5  Quantile Regressions—ROW (Non-EU trade)
A constant is included but not reported; all explanatory variables are 1-year lags; Robust standard errors 
in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(0.10) (0.25) (0.50) (0.75) (0.90)
Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap
ROW 0.033 0.023 0.039** 0.053** 0.018
(0.025) (0.027) (0.020) (0.027) (0.021)
Openness −0.023** −0.020* −0.039*** −0.027*** −0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Pop density (log) −0.259** −0.332*** −0.386*** −0.467*** −0.320***
(0.112) (0.118) (0.086) (0.116) (0.091)
PIP (log) −0.020** −0.019** −0.011* −0.015* −0.011*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Accessibility 0.090 0.070 0.115* 0.217*** 0.151**
(0.079) (0.083) (0.061) (0.082) (0.064)
Observations 650 650 650 650 650
R2 0.833 0.824 0.836 0.856 0.884
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
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growth prospects of the poorest (0.10) and other poor regions (0.25) in the lower tails 
of the income distribution. These regions compete less with EU imports, due to their 
smaller and less sophisticated tradable sectors. This situation shields them from sub-
stitution effects. 
These findings confirm  H1 : the competitive pressures of trading with more tech-
nologically advanced countries are more pronounced in the upper quantiles of the 
regional income distribution. These regions have experienced economic contraction 
due to differences in price, cost competitiveness, and quality of producing similar 
goods and products to those imported from the EU. This is attributed to differences 
in the economies of scale of the industrial sector in Greece compared to its core trad-
ing partners (Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands) and to differences in production 
efficiency, which intensifies within-industry competition.
The negative growth returns from EU trade (mainly in manufacturing) contrast 
with the predictions of new trade theory (NTT) and the endogenous growth theory. 
This partly may reflect the fact that a majority of advanced Greek firms have been 
incapable of competing and/or branching into global value chains with other firms 
in the core of the EU, especially as regards backward linkages (i.e., supplying inter-
mediate products). This could have been a positive source of vertical intra-industry 
trade. Greek firms in general have experienced greater difficulties in this respect than 
their counterparts in Italy and Spain or in Central and Eastern Europe (Konstantako-
poulou 2015). This is likely to have made these regions recipients of cheaper interme-
diate inputs and of technologically advanced inputs from EU countries, crowding out 
domestic suppliers, shedding jobs and growth. This trend has also contributed to the 
large Greek trade deficit (Konstantakopoulou 2015).
An example of the crowding-out of manufacturing activity in the upper quantiles, 
which coincided with the surge of EU imports into Greece, is the prefecture of Viotia. 
During Greece’s growth period (from 2000 to 2008)—coinciding with the highest 
volumes of imports from the EU and the widening of the trade deficit—the upward 
trend of economic activity included almost all the NUTS III regions/prefectures of 
the country, with the exception of Viotia (the neighboring region to Attika, where the 
bulk of the manufacturing activity of Athens, and of Greece as a whole, is located) 
(Psycharis et al. 2014: 74). Viotia, a region with a similar sectoral structure to the EU 
imports, has been more exposed to competition pressures and failed to improve its 
dynamic export capacities.
Table  5 presents the results for regional trade with the ROW across regional 
income quantiles. The ROW variable returns a positive and significant sign for 
wealthier regions and an insignificant one for poorer ones. This finding suggests that 
trade with non-EU countries is beneficial for regions in the top half of the income 
distribution (between 0.50 and 0.90). While these regions lose out from greater inte-
gration with more developed countries, they benefit from trade with less developed 
ones. Industry in these regions is more competitive in non-EU markets, as it is less 
exposed to substitution effects from trade with lower-income countries. Hence, the 
rise in trade with Balkan countries, which intensified in the period 2008–2012, when 
the Balkans became the most important destination for Greek exports, was benefi-
cial for the main Greek industrial hubs (Tsiapa 2019). As indicated by Tsiapa (2019: 
629), “the economic crisis partially suspended the trade co-operation networks 
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between Greece and the EU due to emerging restrictions on financing and credibility, 
and gave emphasis to more flexible co-operation schemes with the Balkans based on 
the advantages of geographical proximity and historical ties—while the export share 
in markets such as Asia and Africa recorded also a notable rise”. This confirms the 
higher relative competitiveness of Greek exports from the more developed regions to 
less developed markets.
In contrast, regions below the Greek average in terms of GDP—which are mainly 
sheltered economies (i.e., relying heavily on the public sector and agricultural sub-
sidies) and have small tradable sectors—did not benefit from the expansion of trade 
with poorer countries following the outbreak of the financial crisis (Petrakos and Psy-
charis 2016). During this crisis, Greek regions manifested “an average 13% increase 
in the level of dependence on sheltered types of activities […] and a decrease of 5% 
in the participation of the tradable sectors in their GDP” (Petrakos and Psycharis 
2016: 146).
As a further robustness check, we replicate the quantile regressions including the 
public share control variable for both sets of regressions (Appendix Tables 8 and 9). 
The coefficients of EU trade and ROW trade remain stable in direction and statisti-
cal significance, confirming the robustness of the main estimates. Interestingly, the 
parameter heterogeneity in the QR reveals that public share is positively related to 
regional growth for the lowest quantile (0.10), which are the sheltered regions, and 
the richest regions (0.90), where the highest functions of public policy related posi-
tions are concentrated.
For a visual representation of the heterogeneity of the main regressors, Fig. 6 dis-
plays the coefficient of the two key variables across regional quantiles, the dotted line 
which is set to zero shows that EU trade has a negative effect on regional growth 
while non-EU trade has a positive effect with fluctuations in magnitude across quan-
tiles. It is evident from the graph that the negative effect of EU trade integration is 
lower in the lower quantiles and grows as we move up the regional income distri-
bution. By contrast, the positive coefficient of the ROW index increases in size and 
becomes significant as we go up the regional income distribution (from the 0.50 up 
to the 0.80), showcasing the positive growth returns—for the more industrialized and 
more advanced regions—from trade with non-EU countries.
5.3  Endogeneity concerns
We address potential endogeneity concerns by means of system GMM estimators 
proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). We also use longer lags of the explanatory 
variables as instruments of their own current values and to improve efficiency (Rood-
man 2009). Table 10 (in Appendix) presents the results of the FE regressor and the 
system GMM estimator, including the standard post estimation tests.
The FE estimator is compared to the GMM estimator with 2–4-year lags. The sys-
tem GMM estimator confirms the statistical significance and direction of the main 
regressor. The test statistics for all specifications are in line with expectations. The 
Arellano-Bond for serial correlation in the first differences of the residual rejects the 
hypothesis of no first-order serial correlation, while it fails to reject at higher orders, 
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Trade with the EU
Trade with the ROW
Fig. 6  Spatial variation of EU Trade and ROW across regional quantiles
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as desired. This allows excluding the presence of residual serial correlation in the 
original error term. In addition, the Hansen statistics (including the Difference-in-
Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets) are used to test overidentifying 
restrictions; the Hansen test (Roodman 2009) returns a p-value of 0.310, confirming 
the validity of the selected instruments in the baseline specifications. We can there-
fore infer that the main regressors are robust both to the inclusion of additional con-
trols and based on the GMM estimation results including the post estimation tests.
6  Conclusion
Trade integration has implications for the economic development of the countries 
involved. In particular, trading with more advanced countries may have different 
implications than trading with less advanced ones and the impacts may vary accord-
ing to the level of development of the regions involved in the process. In this study 
we have explored the impact across the regions of Greece of increases in trade with 
generally more developed countries—represented by trade with the EU—and trade 
with less developed countries—represented by the rest of the world.
The results reveal that increases in trade have not been all that beneficial for Greece 
and, in particular, for some of its regions. There is an overall negative association 
between increases in trade and economic growth in Greece. Specifically, trade with 
the more advanced regions of the EU has been connected to lower growth in the most 
developed regions of Greece, due to dynamics associated with substitution effects. 
Trade integration with the EU has more pronounced effects in the upper quantiles 
of the regional income distribution. Richer regions in Greece have been incapable of 
competing directly with their EU counterparts, due to similarities in the regional sec-
toral profile, leaving then more vulnerable than less developed regions to trade open-
ness. The benefits that richer regions experience as a consequence of increases in 
trade with the rest of the world do, however, not compensate for the economic losses 
of trade integration with the EU.
In line with theoretical and empirical findings of related studies (Krugman and 
Livas Elizondo 1996; Paluzie 2001; Rodríguez Pose and Gill 2006; Rodríguez-
Pose 2012), less developed regions in Greece are also unable to reap the benefits 
of deeper integration, which is reflected in the absence of positive effects of the 
EU trade. In more advanced regions substitution effects are at work. Regional 
industrial growth in Greece’s core has been negatively affected by increases in 
EU trade (Kallioras and Petrakos 2010; Petrakos et al. 2012). The most advanced 
regions in Greece have remained not competitive for trade integration with the 
more advanced partners of the EU. Their relatively weak industrial structures and 
institutional weaknesses prevent them from reaping the growth-inducing effects of 
trade resulting from the opening of their markets to more advanced trading part-
ners. Finally, the evidence shows that the median region is the one more likely to 
lose out from trade integration with richer countries. This has important policy 
implications for the spatial distribution of future public investment programmes 
and the Structural Funds allocation objectives that aim to address the negative 
effects of integration.
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The successions of crises that have recently affected Greece—from the global 
financial crisis to the more recent Covid-19-related pandemic—combined with the 
absence of counter-veiling policy measures and the low growth returns from trade 
may  trigger a further decline in the growth prospects for more advanced regions. 
To avoid this, spatially redistributive and regionally sensitive macroeconomic (fis-
cal) policies and institutional reforms are needed to reverse a vicious cycle that will 
deprive regions of their real potential. A posteriori, trade integration is not always a 
panacea for growth. Like with any policy, there are winners and losers from process 
of trade integration. Complementary policies are needed in combination with a real-
istic fiscal plans to address the weaknesses related to the structure and geography of 
Greece and allow its tradable sector to survive and upgrade. These policies could 
include a customized industrial policy tailored to the needs of the local industry with 
an emphasis on upgrading the productivity of import competing regions, increase the 
technological complexity of Greek industry, and allow it to diversify into related sec-
tors. Only by increasing the technological and innovative capacity and the productiv-
ity of firms can Greek export competitiveness in higher value-added manufacturing 
be promoted. Regional policies in Greece should also be designed with the aim of 
upgrading those import competing regions that have suffered the most from trade 
integration. This could be done through re-training and on-the-job schemes and by 
providing financial incentives for the promotion and adoption of innovation by Greek 
firms. To this end, the public investment programme and the allocation of EU SFs—
as well as the Next Generation Recovery fund—need to re-focus on promoting R&D 
activities and university-industry linkages in high value-added activities with a clear 
focus on facilitating funding and simplifying the regulatory framework for invest-
ment and business creation.
While our research has provided some answers to the problems a country like 
Greece has experienced when integrating with the trade partners, further research is 
needed to fine-tune both factors behind this negative impact and provide better solu-
tions to the problem. In particular, further research should focus on industry-specific 
shocks and the effects on employment and wage outcomes at the regional level, as 
well as on the compositional nature of employment responses (i.e., low- versus high-
skilled labor) in transforming regional labor markets. Moreover, a meaningful task for 
future empirical investigation can be the replication of this type of analysis in different 
contexts to assess the validity of the current study and to derive evidence for cross-
country and cross-regional comparisons of trading with more and less developed 
partners.
Appendix
See Tables 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.    
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Table 7  Regression results 
before and during the crisis
All explanatory variables are 1-year lags
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * 
p < 0.1
Pre-crisis: 2000–2008 During crisis: 2009–2013
Log GDP/cap Log GDP/cap




Log PopDen −0.260 −1.301***
(0.300) (0.356)




Region FE YES YES
Year FE YES YES
Table 8  QR regressions—EU Trade (extended versions)
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(0.10) (0.25) (0.50) (0.75) (0.90)
Variables Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap
EU trade −0.032 −0.029 −0.048** −0.069** −0.047**
(0.029) (0.030) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023)
Openness −0.344*** −0.318*** −0.378*** −0.501*** −0.349***
(0.111) (0.119) (0.091) (0.115) (0.091)
Pop density (log) −0.028*** −0.018* −0.036*** −0.020** −0.006
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
PIP (log) −0.022*** −0.017** −0.013** −0.014* −0.010
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Accessibility 0.059 0.065 0.107* 0.247*** 0.179***
(0.078) (0.083) (0.063) (0.080) (0.063)
Public Share 0.385** 0.252 0.054 0.279 0.349**
(0.174) (0.185) (0.142) (0.180) (0.142)
Observations 650 650 650 650 650
R2 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.88
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
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Table 9  QR regressions—nonEU Trade (extended versions)
Robust standard errors in parentheses ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
(0.10) (0.25) (0.50) (0.75) (0.90)
Variables Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap Log GDP cap
ROW 0.041 0.026 0.041** 0.047* 0.021
(0.026) (0.028) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021)
Openness −0.318*** −0.307** −0.389*** −0.490*** −0.340***
(0.111) (0.120) (0.090) (0.115) (0.092)
Pop density (log) −0.032*** −0.019* −0.040*** −0.026** −0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
PIP (log) −0.024*** −0.018** −0.011* −0.014* −0.010
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
Accessibility 0.052 0.052 0.106* 0.226*** 0.157**
(0.077) (0.083) (0.063) (0.080) (0.064)
Public Share 0.444** 0.250 0.018 0.269 0.375***
(0.173) (0.187) (0.141) (0.179) (0.143)
Observations 650 650 650 650 650
R2 0.88 0.83 0.88 0.85 0.83
Region FE YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Table 10  Dynamic panel-data 
estimation, system GMM
Dependent variable is the log GDP per cap.; robust standard errors 
in parentheses clustered at the region level; ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, 
* p < 0.1












Year FE YES YES
Region FE YES NO
Hansen statistic – 5.96
p-value 0.310
AR(1) statistic – −4.72
p-value 0.000
AR(2) statistic Variables −0.35
p-value 0.725
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